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Abstract
Cryptographic protocols have so far been analyzed for the most part by means of testing
(which does not yield proofs of secrecy) and theorem proving (costly). We propose a new
approach, based on abstract interpretation and using regular tree languages. The abstraction we
use seems ,ne-grained enough to be able to certify some protocols. Both the concrete and
abstract semantics of the protocol description language and implementation issues are discussed
in the paper.
c© 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Our goal is to provide mathematical and algorithmic tools for the analysis of cryp-
tographic protocols through abstract interpretation.
1.1. Verifying cryptographic protocols
Cryptographic protocols are speci,cations for sequences of messages to be exchanged
by machines (often called principals) on a possibly insecure network, such as the
Internet, to establish private or authenticated communication. These protocols can be
used to distribute sensitive information, such as classi,ed material, credit card numbers
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or trade secrets, or to create digital signatures. Cryptographic protocols in everyday use
on personal machines include the secure socket layer (SSL), used for secure World-
Wide-Web transactions, and secure shell (SSH), used for the secure remote control of
machines.
An intruder having gained partial or total control over the communication network
may launch an attack on the protocol. We distinguish two classes of attacks: pas-
sive attacks, where an intruder passively listens to the communication network, and
active attacks where the intruder can suppress messages and send its own messages.
On the practical side, it should be noted that passive attacks on local area networks
are generally very simple to mount, just requiring running adequate software on a
machine connected to the network, which will then listen to the network and log
any data packet transmitted. Active attacks are more elaborate and diCcult to mount,
since in their primitive setting (“man in the middle attack”) they involve cutting a
running network line and plugging an intruding machine in the middle. Yet active
attacks can be performed with less intrusive means such as “DNS spoo,ng” [26],
which makes a machine obtain a wrong Internet Protocol address for a remote host;
the machine then communicates with an intruder believing it is actually the remote
server it meant to communicate with. It is therefore important to consider both pas-
sive and active attacks when analyzing the security of a cryptographic protocol. Our
analysis thus considers the worst case, where the intruder is able to read or suppress
any messages sent on the network and forge any message that it can realistically
concoct.
Many analyses techniques for cryptographic protocols have been proposed; the next
sub-section will give a short survey of them. A common feature of these techniques,
including ours, is that they address the design of the protocol rather than the strength
of the underlying cryptographic algorithms, such as message digests or encryption
primitives. For instance, it is assumed that one may decrypt a message encrypted with
a public key only when possessing the corresponding private key. Even with those
restrictions, many protocols have been shown to be Jawed.
This paper intends to demonstrate how abstract interpretation techniques, and more
particularly abstract model checking of in,nite state computation systems, can be ap-
plied to the problem of analyzing cryptographic protocols for con,dentiality and other
safety properties. To our knowledge, this is the ,rst time that an abstract domain has
been proposed for cryptographic protocols.
Our method tests safety properties (i.e. that the protocol cannot reach certain unde-
sirable states). An obvious safety property, and the only one that is implemented in
our analyzer, is secrecy: we prove that the intruder cannot receive certain information.
Other safety properties that can be dealt with using our method include some variants
of authentication: we can prove that some principal can reach an “accepting” state only
if some data it holds is the correct one.
A salient point of our approach is that is fully automatic from the protocol descrip-
tion to the results. Contrary to some other methods that use abstraction, but require
the user to design himself an abstraction or manually help a program to compute in-
variants, our method requires no user input except the description of the protocol and
the cryptographic primitives involved.
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1.2. Comparison to related works
Burrows, Abadi and Needham proposed to analyze cryptographic protocols using
a logic of belief, now known as the “BAN logic” [10]. Several derivatives of this
logic have followed [22,21,42,43]. All those systems provide a means to formalize the
high-level reasoning that stands behind the protocols. Such informal reasoning often
uses steps such as “Principal B receives a message signed with Ka, and Ka is a se-
cret key only owned by A; therefore, this message must have been emitted by A at
some point in the past”. The goals of those systems is to make such proofs more
rigorous.
There are two important problems with logics of belief. The ,rst is that it is es-
sentially a manual approach. While there exist tools [38,28,16,40] which automatically
check whether the purported conclusion follows from the hypotheses of the protocol de-
scription using the rules in the logic, the formalization of the reasoning of the protocol
inside the logic is a manual, cumbersome and error-prone act, even though some of the
available decision procedures can be modi,ed so as to provide some hints as to missing
or incorrect hypotheses to the user [38]. The second is that most of those logics do not
have clear semantics. Some semantics have nevertheless been provided for some logics
of belief [6], including some more recent work on strand spaces [44], yet designing a
sound and usable semantics for those logics remains largely a work-in-progress.
In contrast with these logics, our method is fully automatic and operates on the
actual de,nition of the protocols, not on some diCcult-to-establish justi,cation of them.
Furthermore, our analysis is proven to be sound with respect to some simple formal
semantics of the protocols.
The limitations of logics of belief clearly show a need for analyses based on the
actual executions of the protocol, and not on some justi,cation of it. Dolev and Yao
proposed a formal model of cryptographic protocols where cryptographic primitives
(encryption, decryption, signature, etc.) obey a set of algebraic properties (such as: de-
crypting some encrypted piece of data using the same key with which it was encrypted
yields the original, unencrypted piece of data). Our analysis is set in a particular for-
malization of the Dolev–Yao model; it expresses the protocols and the properties of
the primitives in a simple language and gives them a precise semantics.
Many analyses of protocols have been expressed within the Dolev–Yao model. The
,rst ones used Prolog or Prolog-like state exploration techniques [35]. Later contribu-
tions have focused on implementing state-space exploration techniques model checkers,
whether general-purpose [30,32] or special-purpose [41]. While often eCcient at ,nding
bugs, those approaches often cannot guarantee that there exists no sequence of actions
from the intruder that can exhibit the faulty behavior. To work around this limitation
in some cases, some criteria for the completeness of a ,nite state space have been
proposed [31]. Alternatively, one can supplement the automatic search with inductive
proofs [34].
Summarily, those approaches explore a subset of all possible attacks in the model,
and thus cannot yield sound security proofs without some additional work. On the
other hand, they can yield an actual trace of attack. In contrast, our method explores
a superset of all possible attacks and thus can yield secrecy or other safety proofs.
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Fig. 1. The abstract transition relation follows the concrete one.
More recently, several symbolic approaches to the analysis of cryptographic pro-
tocols have been proposed, among which ours [37] and Jean Goubault-Larrecq [25],
both based on regular sets of terms represented by automata while some others [20,8]
consider other similar symbolic representations. These methods aim at circumventing
the limitations of model-checking by using ,nite representations of in,nite sets, coupled
with some safe approximations (i.e. the analysis somehow overestimates the power of
the adversary).
Another model for cryptographic protocols is Abadi and Gordon’s spi-calculus [5,4],
an extension to cryptographic protocols of the -calculus, a process algebra. Several
type systems suitable for proving security properties have been proposed [1–3]. These
type systems allow proving that the data-Jow in the protocol is secure, that is, that no
sensitive information can Jow to insecure channels. However, they restrict the class
of protocols that can be considered and require extensive type annotations and manual
derivation of typing proofs. This approach is certainly powerful since it can deal with
very complex communication networks and protocols; on the other hand, those analyses
are essentially manual while ours is automatic.
1.3. Abstract interpretation
Abstract interpretation [14,15] is a generic theory for the analysis of computation
systems. Its basic idea is to use approximations in ordered domains in a known direction
(lower or upper), to get reliable results. This order relation is preserved throughout
monotonic operators.
Here we shall approximate transition systems. We consider a transition relation r on
a “concrete” state space . We also consider an “abstract” transition relation r] on an
abstract state space ]. An abstraction relation a⊆×] links the two spaces. By
a−1(X ]) where X ]⊆], we mean {x∈ | ∃x]∈X ]a(x; x])}.
For instance,  could be ˝(Z), where ˝(X ) notes the power-set of X , and ] the
set of (possibly empty) intervals of Z (given by their bounds). The abstraction relation,
in that example, is the following:
∀X ∈ ˝(Z) a(X; [; ]) ⇔ X ⊆ [; ]:
We require that the two relations satisfy the following simulation condition 1 (see
Fig. 1):
∀x; y ∈ ; x] ∈ ]; r(x; y) ∧ a(x; x])⇒ ∃y] ∈ ]|r](x]; y]) ∧ a(y; y]):
1 Readers coming from a type theory background may see it as a kind of subject reduction property.
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This implies that for all 0 and ]0 so that a(0; 
]
0), noting A∗ = { | 0→∗r } and
A]∗= {] | ]0→∗r] ]}; A∗⊆ a−1(A]∗).
We are only interested here in safety properties; in the concrete model we are con-
sidering here, liveness properties cannot be obtained, since the intruder can deny any
network service by just stopping network transmission. To prove that a property P
holds for all elements in A∗, it is suCcient to show that it holds for all elements in
r−1(A]∗). That will be the basic idea of our method of analysis.
2. Informal semantics
The ,rst diCculty in formal analyses of cryptographic protocol is the choice of the
formalism in which to express the protocol and a suitable semantics.
Although speci,cation languages such as CAPSL [36] or CLAP [24] and other
notations [11] have been developed, it is diCcult to ,nd a model for which analy-
sis is tractable and that does not introduce intolerable inaccuracies.
In this section, we shall give an informal account of our version of the Dolev–Yao
model, as well as a description of the input syntax of our implemented analyzer.
2.1. Our version of the Dolev–Yao model
The most common approach to analyzing cryptographic protocols is to abstract away
the actual cryptographic primitives (public or private key encryption, hash functions,
etc.) being used. Those primitives are only characterized by some algebraic properties
reJecting their ideal behavior. Our analysis scheme must then base its deductions on
those properties.
For instance, we consider a symmetric encryption primitive encrypt(X; K) taking a
piece of data X and a key K . Symmetric key encryption means that the same key that
has been used for encrypting the message can be used to decrypt it. This means that
if an intruder owns encrypt(X; K) and the key K , then it can obtain X . Furthermore,
our encryption is supposed to be strong enough so that the only way to get X from
encrypt(X; K) is to own the key K .
This example suggests that we should consider the messages exchanged in the ana-
lyzed system to be terms over a signature consisting of all the primitives. For instance,
a protocol making use of symmetric encryption is modeled with messages built on the
following algebra: encrypt(· ; ·) (encryption) and pair(· ; ·) (pairing).
Such models of cryptographic protocols have been introduced by Dolev and Yao [11].
The speci,cation for a protocol then contains:
• the naming and arities of primitives,
• the properties of those primitives,
• the protocol steps.
Our analysis method restricts the class of properties that can be expressed and the
transition rules for the protocol steps.
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It has to be noted that even with those restrictions, it is possible to specify a protocol
whose security is undecidable [11, Section 4.2.1].
2.2. Primitives (CONSTRUCTORS clause)
Here is an example of a speci,cation of primitives:
CONSTRUCTORS
{
pair(P,P);
proj1(N);
proj2(N);
encrypt(P,N);
decrypt(P,N);
private Na;
}
Primitives may be speci,ed either as public (no keyword) or private (private key-
word). A public primitive can be freely used by the intruder ; for instance, the en-
cryption primitive may freely be used by the intruder, since we assume that he knows
which cryptographic primitives we use and that he has a working implementation of
them. This is consistent with KerckhoPs’ rule that the secrecy must reside entirely in
the key (not in the secrecy of the encryption mechanism or algorithm) [39, 1.1]. On
the other hand, private primitives reJect informations or operations that the intruder
does not know: for instance, some secret constants are speci,ed as 0-ary primitives.
The letters P and N in the arity are used to implement some elementary sanity check
for the actions of the principals. A principal may only use pattern matching to extract
patterns from ,elds designed by P (pattern), not from ,elds designed by N (no pattern).
Indeed, if a principal knows a key K, it can match an incoming piece of data against
encrypt(x, K) and extract x, but it would be absurd for it to match an incoming piece
of data against encrypt(X, k) and extract the key k. Those letters have no actual role
in the analysis, they are just meant to exclude some obvious errors in the speci,cation
in the front-end of the analyzer.
2.3. Rewriting rules (RULES clause)
In our case, the rules are:
proj1(pair(x,y)) => x;
proj2(pair(x,y)) => y;
decrypt(encrypt(x, k), k) => x;
Those rules mean, respectively:
• that the intruder may freely project the left side of a pair it owns;
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• that the intruder may freely project the right side of a pair it owns;
• that the intruder may decrypt an encrypted message it owns, provided it also owns
the corresponding key.
It is possible to model several encryption systems in the same protocol: one only has
to specify several primitives encrypt1, encrypt2, etc. It is also possible to model a
public-key cryptosystem as follows:
publicDecrypt(publicEncrypt(x, k), privateKey(k)) => x
where privateKey is a private unary constructor. When x is a public key, privateKey
(x) is the corresponding private key. Of course, privateKey is a PRIVATE constructor.
2.4. The intruder; completion rules
All communications go through the intruder. When a principal outputs a message, it
sends it to the intruder. When a principal inputs a message, it gets it from the intruder.
This model thus assumes that the intruder has entire control of the communication
network and can modify or concoct messages at will. Of course, it is impossible to
prove that a protocol completes its task in such a model, since the intruder can just
stop transmitting any message. On the other hand, we can establish properties such
as the secrecy of some piece of information, or whether principals always fail before
reaching a certain point of the protocol if fed improper information by the intruder.
The intruder is limited in its computations. It has a set of initially known pieces of
data, and enriches that set as it receives messages. It completes that set of messages
using:
• the publicly available primitives (Section 2.2),
• the rewriting rules (Section 2.3).
2.5. The initial and secure knowledge speci<cations (INTRUDER KNOWLEDGE and
SECRETS clauses)
The initial knowledge of the intruder is speci,ed in the INTRUDER KNOWLEDGE clause
(actually, the initial knowledge of the intruder is the completion of the knowledge
speci,ed by the intruder by the rules—see Section 2.4).
2.6. Principals (PRINCIPAL clauses)
Each principal runs its part of the protocol. The usual notation is to identify principals
by a letter such as A or B, or S for servers. If there are several instances of the protocol
running concurrently or successively, there are several instances (A1; A2; : : : ; B1; B2; : : :)
of each of the principals described in the protocol description; alternatively, the same
principal may only have one instance (a single server may serve several sessions).
For instance, protocols featuring a server are generally modeled with a common server
principal for all sessions, while the other principals have one instance per session. Such
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distinction between instances of the same principal is important if they are supposed
to generate unique identi,ers or random numbers in each instance (see 2.7).
2.6.1. Registers (REGISTER clause)
Each principal has a ,nite number of registers, each containing no value or a term.
For the sake of clarity, registers are given names reJecting the data a correct execution
of the protocol should store in that register. For instance, kab is the name of a register
meant to contain the communication key between principals A and B. Semi-formal
speci,cations of protocols often call with the same identi,er (say Kab) two diPerent
things:
• an unique constant generated at run-time for each session of the protocol,
• registers in one or more principals meant to contain that constant.
Of course, while in a correct run of the protocol those registers indeed contain that
constant after some point of the protocol, an intruder might well concoct messages so
that some principal “thinks” some value is a correct communication key, store it into
the appropriate register and then use it as a legitimate key. It is therefore important to
distinguish between those two meanings.
2.6.2. Speci<cation of actions (PROGRAM)
A principal may at a given moment, depend on the current instruction it has to
execute:
• Input a message into a register (?register). The message is actually input from the
intruder (who, in our model, controls the network); the message obtained from the
intruder can be any piece of data that the intruder can compute (Section 2.4).
For instance, if the intruder initially knew X and received Y from a principal, it
can compute pair(X,Y) and send it to the principal that executes ?r. That principal
will then store pair(X,Y) into register r.
• Output a message, made from constants and register contents (!message). In our
notation, the message is a term containing constructors, constants and register names.
The principal computes the actual message by replacing the register names by the
current values of the registers. The message is then output to the intruder, which
uses it to increase its knowledge.
For instance, if register data contains X and register kab contains Kab, then!
encrypt(data, kab) will output encrypt(X, Kab) to the intruder.
• Match the contents of a register against a pattern (register =~pattern). The pattern
can specify constants, current contents of registers (register) or destination registers
($register). If the pattern fails, the principal considers that the protocol has failed
and stops.
This action is complex to describe formally, but really simple informally. Let us
suppose that register r contains encrypt(X, Kab) and that register kab contains
Kab. After the principal execute r =~encrypt($data, kab), register data will
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contain X. If r had contained encrypt(X, Kas), the match would have failed and
the principal would have stopped executing.
The execution of the protocol steps is sequential. If a match step fails, the principal
ceases to execute the protocol ( fail-stop behavior [23]).
The behavior of all principals is interleaved: at a given time, any principal ready to
execute an action can execute it. This leads to many possible interleaving of actions.
2.7. Nonces and key generation
Many protocols call for the use of nonces; a nonce is a number that is generated
once for each session of the protocol. A nonce can be a session key or any number
that is unique to a session. A nonce is supposed to be fresh; that is, it has not been
used in a previous session of the protocol (or at least it is very unlikely that it has
been used before).
We model nonces by unique constants that cannot be uni,ed with any other constant.
If a nonce is unique to a session, we use one constant per session. So, for instance, if
a server S generates a key Kab then we will use a constant Kab to represent the key.
2.8. Limitations of this model
There are pitfalls to this approach:
(1) Some properties of the primitives may have been ignored. For instance, some
primitives are malleable [17]; for instance, an intruder can transform some en-
crypted text encrypt(X; K) into some other text encrypt(Y; K) without knowing
the key K . It would be necessary to reJect such behavior in the rules describing
the primitives.
(2) Such a model do not take probabilistic leaks of information into account [9]. We
do not take into account attacks using statistical inference.
(3) Our model has “subliminal channels”. It is possible to hide information in complex
ways, such as encrypting something n times with the same key and using the result
as a means to transmit n. We do not handle such methods of transmission, which
anyway are not used in most protocols.
(4) Representing concatenation with pairing is not very accurate. In real-life protocols,
concatenation is associative. Furthermore, a real-life intruder might split data in
ways that are not allowed by this model, such as taking only one byte of a 32-bit
value.
As we shall see later, it is diCcult to accurately model associativity properties in
term algebras. Our implementation therefore does not take associativity into account.
Even with this limitation, our method found a “bug” in a well-known protocol (Section
7.2). Whether or not the bug exists in the formal model depends on how n-tuples have
been split.
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2.9. An example: the Otway-Rees protocol
In this section, we shall see on a simple example (the Otway-Rees protocol [10,
Section 4]) how to model a protocol in our model. We shall again use the input
syntax of our simple analyzer.
In the cryptography literature, the Otway-Rees protocol is described as follows:
Message 1 A→ B M ;A;B; {Na;M ;A;B}Kas ;
Message 2 B → S M ;A;B; {Na;M ;A;B}Kas ; {Nb;M ;A;B}Kbs ;
Message 3 S → B M ; {Na;Kab}Kas ; {Nb;Kab}Kbs ;
Message 4 B → A M ; {Na;Kab}Kas :
{X }K is a notation for “X encrypted with the key K”. The following paragraphs will
explain the other notations.
The Otway-Rees protocol features three principals: one server S and two clients A
and B. A and B each have a shared key, Kas and Kbs, respectively, for communication
with the server S. Those two clients wish to communicate together using a shared key
Kab, on which they have to agree. They use S as a middleman so as to agree on a
shared secret key Kab. Of course, it is hoped that when they do so, no intruder can
get hold of that key Kbs (secrecy) and that both machines, if completing the protocol
successfully, get the correct key Kbs (correct key distribution). We suppose of course
that both keys Kas and Kbs are kept secret from the intruder.
This protocol, as many others, makes use of nonces, also known as confounders.
These are random pieces of data that are generated for each run of the protocol by
some of the principals. They are meant to foil some attacks such as replaying parts
of an older transaction (replay attacks); here, principal A generates nonces M and Na
and principal B generates nonce Nb.
As said in Section 2.7, we model both nonces and keys using private constants
(i.e. 0-ary constructors that are not supposed to be initially known by the intruder and
are not guessable by him). There is, however, a distinction to be made between two
meanings for the same notation in the above description of the protocol:
• in some cases, a name (say, “Na”) is a constant initially known by the principal that
emits the message; it is therefore to be treated as a symbolic constant Na;
• in other cases, the same name Na denotes a value that the principal has previously
acquired from the network and stored into a register (called na); in a normal (without
intrusion) run of the protocol, this value should be equal to Na.
We model only one run of the protocol; that is, we simulate only three machines A; B
and S. n simultaneous multiple runs of the protocol with the same server could be
simulated by considering machines A1; : : : ; An and B1; : : : ; Bn.
CONSTRUCTORS
{
pair(P,P);
proj1(N);
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proj2(N);
encrypt(P,N);
decrypt(P,N);
private Kas;
private Kbs;
private Kab;
private M;
private Na;
private Nb;
private X;
private A;
private B;
S;
}
RULES
{
proj1(pair(x,y)) => x;
proj2(pair(x,y)) => y;
decrypt(encrypt(x, k), k) => x;
}
INTRUDER KNOWLEDGE
{}
SECRETS
{ X
}
PRINCIPAL A
{
REGISTERS { r, kab }
PROGRAM {
! pair(A, pair(B, pair(M, encrypt(pair(pair(Na, M), pair(A, B)), Kas))));
? r;
r =~ pair(B, pair(A, encrypt(pair(Na, $kab), Kas)));
! encrypt(X, kab);
}
}
PRINCIPAL B
{
REGISTERS { r, m, a, z, kab }
PROGRAM {
? r;
r =~ pair($a, pair(B, pair($m, $z)));
!pair(B, pair(S, pair(a, pair(z, encrypt(pair(pair(Nb, m), pair(a, B)). Kbs)))));
? r;
r =~ pair(S, pair(B, pair($z, encrypt(pair(Nb, $kab), Kbs))));
! pair(B, pair(a, z));
}
}
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PRINCIPAL S
{
REGISTERS { m, r, a, b, na, nb }
PROGRAM {
? r;
r =~ pair($b, pair(S, pair($m, pair($a, pair($b, pair(
encrypt(pair(pair($na, $m), pair($a, $b)), Kas),
encrypt(pair(pair($nb, $m), pair($a, $b)), Kbs)))))));
! pair(S, pair(b, pair(m, pair(
encrypt(pair(na, Kab), Kas),
encrypt(pair(nb, Kab), Kbs)))));
}
}
3. Formal semantics
In this section, we give a formal semantics to the cryptographic protocols, corre-
sponding to the informal semantics presented in the preceding section. We shall later
prove the correction of our analysis with respect to this formal semantics.
3.1. Terms and completion rules
Let us consider a signature [27, p. 249] [13, preliminaries] F and the free algebra of
terms T (F) on that signature. A signature is simply a couple (; a) where  is a set of
function names and a is a function from  to the set of nonnegative integers N called
the arity. The function names in the example of Section 2.9 are pair, encrypt,
each of arity 2, and various constants (Na) of arity 0. The free algebra T (F) of terms
upon the signature is just the set of syntactic terms built using those function names
(for instance, encrypt(Na, Kas)).
Messages exchanged on the network are elements of that algebra. We will also
consider the algebra T (F;X) of terms with variables in X. When t ∈T (F;X); (Xi)i∈I
is a family of variables, (ti)i∈I is a family of terms, we write t[ti=Xi] the term obtained
by parallel substitution of Xi by ti in t. We note FV(t) the set of free variables of t.
Let us also consider a notion of “possible computation”; this notion is de,ned by
a function K :˝(T (F))→˝(T (F)) that computes the closure of a subset of T (F)
by the following operations:
• a subset O of the function symbols found in F; that is, if the symbol f belongs to
the subset On of elements of O of arity n, then for all n-tuple (xi)16i6n of elements
of K(X ), then f(x1; : : : ; xn) belongs to K(X );
• a set R of rules of a certain kind described in the next paragraph.
So an element x of T (F) is deemed to be “possibly computable” from X ⊆T (F) if
x∈K(X ). We write ˝(T (F))K the ,xpoints of K.
We require that the rules in R be of the following form: t => x, where t is a term
with variables and x is a variable appearing exactly once in t (collapsing rules).
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3.2. Concrete semantics
Let us consider a ,nite set P of principals. Each principal p∈P has a ,nite set
Rp of registers, each containing an element of T (F)∪{%}—the % element meaning
“uninitialized”—and a program xp to execute. We shall actually ignore uninitialized
elements, since protocols using uninitialized elements do not make real sense; our anal-
ysis therefore refuses protocols that make use of uninitialized registers using a simple
syntactic check. The program is a ,nite sequence (possibly empty) of commands, which
can be of the three possible types:
Output to network !t, read as “output t”, where t ∈T (F; Rp);
Pattern matching r0 =~ t, read as “match register r0 against t”, where r0 ∈{1; : : : ; rp}
and t ∈T (F; Rp ∪ $Rp); $Rp= {$r | r ∈Rp} is a copy of Rp obtained by pre,xing each
register name by a $ sign.
The diPerence of meaning between r and $r is as follows:
• r at position  in the term notes the current value of register r; the sub-term
at position  of the value in register r0 is matched against the current value in
register r;
• $r notes that the sub-term at position  of the value in register r0 should be stored
into register r.
Input from network ?r, read as “input register r”, where r ∈Rp.
We shall write h :: t the sequence whose head is h and tail t, and ' the empty
sequence. The local state of a principal is therefore the content of its registers and the
program it has yet to execute. The global state is the tuple (indexed by P) of the local
states, together with the state of the intruder, which is an element of ˝(T (F))K. The
set of global states is noted .
We de,ne the semantics of the system by a nondeterministic transition relation →
(nondeterminism arises because of the interleavings of the actions of the principals
and because of the choices of the adversary). Let S and S ′ be two global states. We
denote S:p the local state of the principal p in S and S:I the intruder knowledge in
S. In a local state L, we note L:r the contents of register r and L:P the program. The
de,nition of the transition relation is the following: S→ S ′ if there exists p0 ∈P so
that:
• for all p∈P so that p = p0; S ′:p= S:p;
• S:p0:P= h :: ) and either
Input from network h= ?r0 and
◦ for all r ∈Rp0 ; S ′:p0:r= S:p0: r,
◦ S ′:p0: r0 ∈ S:I
◦ S ′:p0:P= )
Output to network h= !t and
◦ for all r ∈Rp0 ; S ′:p0:r= S:p0:r (this does not change the state of any register),
◦ S ′: I =K(S:I ∪{t[S:p0:r=r | r ∈Rp0 ]}) (the intruder now knows t and uses it to
increase its knowledge);
◦ S ′:p0:P= ) (the principal p0 has yet to execute the rest of its program).
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Pattern matching h= r0 =~ t and either
◦ there exists a substitution 1 : $Rp→T (F) so that r0 = t[1; 2] where 2 is the
substitution r → S:p0:r and t[1; 2] is the result of the application to the term t
of both substitutions 1 and 2; then
for all r ∈Rp0 so that $r is not a free variable in t; S ′:p0:r= S:p0:r (registers
not meant to receive results from the pattern are left untouched);
for all r ∈Rp0 so that $r is a free variable in t; S ′:p0:r= 1(r) (registers meant
to receive results from the pattern get the desired results);
S ′I = SI (as there is no network communication involved, the intruder gets no
new knowledge);
S ′:p0:P= ) (the principal p0 has yet to execute the rest of its program);
◦ such a substitution does not exist; then
for all r ∈Rp0 ; S ′:p0:r= S:p0:r;
S ′I = SI (as there is no network communication involved, the intruder gets no
new knowledge);
S ′:p0:P= ' (the principal considers that the protocol has failed for some reason
and stops executing it—fail-stop behavior).
Please note that the pattern matching is not done modulo the rules de,ned in Section
3.1. This should not be a problem in most cases. Furthermore, it is possible to slightly
complexify the semantics by requiring that the rewriting rules should be applied after
each computation step. For the sake of brevity, we will not treat that extension in this
paper.
4. Tree automata and operations on them
Regular languages, implemented as ,nite automata, are often used to abstract sets of
words on an alphabet. Here, we abstract sets of terms on a signature by regular tree
languages, and we consider the generalization of ,nite automata to n-ary constructors:
tree automata [13].
Please note that the algorithms presented here are given mainly as proofs that the
functions described are computable. There are several ways to implement the same
functions, and e@cient implementations are likely to be more complex than the simple
schemes given here.
4.1. Special tree automata
We use nondeterministic top-down tree automata [13, Section 1.6] to represent sub-
sets of T (F); an automaton is a ,nite representation the subsets of terms it recognizes.
A top-down tree automaton over F is a tuple A= 〈Q; q0; ,) where Q is a ,nite set
of states, q0 ∈Q is the initial state and , is a set of rewrite rules 2 over the signature
2 The reader should not confuse these rewrite rules, meant as a notation for the tree automaton, with the
rewrite rules in R.
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Fig. 2. An automaton ({q0; : : : ; q4}; q0; ,) on the signature F with added constants {X; K1; K2} recognizing
{encrypt(X;encrypt(K1; K2)); K1; K2}. (a) The tree. The circled nodes represent the states, the others
the symbols. (b) The set , of rewrite rules.
F∪Q where the states are seen as unary symbols. The rules in , must be of the
following type:
q(f(x1; : : : ; xn))→A f(q1(x1); : : : ; qn(xn));
where n¿0 f∈Fn, q; q1; : : : ; qn ∈Q, x1; : : : ; xn being variables. When n=0, the rule
is therefore of the form q(a)→ a. De,ning
Lq(a) = {t ∈ T (F) | q(t)→∗A t}
we denote by L(a)=Lq0 (A) the language recognized by A.
We actually will be using a narrower subclass of tree automata, which we be referred
to as special automata, over F; we shall note the set of these automata AF. A special
automaton can be represented as a tree (see an example Fig. 2). Such a tree has two
kind of nodes:
states that have:
• an (unordered and possibly empty) list of children, which are all symbol nodes;
• a boolean Jag;
symbols that have an ordered list of children; there are as many as children as the
arity of the symbol.
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The symbolics in terms of rewrite rules of such a tree are the following:
• where q; q1; : : : ; qn are states and s is a n-ary symbol stands for the rewrite
rule q(s(x1; : : : ; xn))→A s(q1(x1); : : : ; qn(xn));
• the Jag on a state q, when true (represented by
O
), means the set of rules
{q(s(x1; : : : ; xn))→A s(q(x1); : : : ; q(xn)) | s∈On; n∈N}.
Implementing the special automata as such trees allows for easy sharing of parts of
the data structures.
A formal de,nition of the class of set automata is that the set , of rewrite rules
de,ning a special automaton can be partitioned between two subsets:
• rules of the form q(f(x1; : : : ; xn))→f(q(x1); : : : ; q(xn)) where q∈Q and f∈On; we
require that if there exists n¿0 and f∈On so that q(f(x1; : : : ; xn))→f(q(x1); : : : ;
q(xn))∈, then ∀n¿0, ∀f∈On, q(f(x1; : : : ; xn))→f(q(x1); : : : ; q(xn))∈,;
• rules of the form q(f(x1; : : : ; xn))→f(q1(x1); : : : ; qn(xn)) where q; q1; : : : ; qn ∈Q; we
require the directed graph (Q; E) whose vertices are the states and the arrows are of
the form q→E qi, 16i6n for all the rules of the above form to be a tree.
4.2. Union
The union of two languages representable using special automata A and B is repre-
sented by the special automaton AunionsqB obtained by joining A and B at the root.
4.3. Substitution and matching
We extend canonically our de,nition of substitution of terms into terms into a def-
inition of substitution of languages (sets of terms) into terms with variables. We fur-
thermore overload this substitution notation to also consider a substitution function
on automata so that for any term t and automata Ai, L(t[Ai=Xi])= t[L(Ai)=xi]. Such a
substitution function, using only special automata, can be easily de,ned by induction
on t.
Now we consider the reverse problem: given a language L and a term with vari-
ables t, give the set of solutions of L= t[xi=Xi]. Such a solution is a family (Li)
of languages so that L= t[Li=Xi]. We thus consider a function match so that if A is
an automaton and t a term with variables, match(A; t) is a ,nite subset of FV (t)→AF
and for any solution S in this set, L=L(t[Si=Xi]). A computational de,nition
follows.
We de,ne matchl(A; t), where A= 〈Q; q0; ,〉 is an automaton and t ∈T (F;X),
recursively over the structure of t. Its value is a ,nite subset of FV (t)→AF.
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• if t= s(t1; : : : ; tn) where s is an n-ary symbol, then
matchl(A; t) = {1x∈X{∪{pi | ∀16 i 6 n; pi ∈ matchl(〈Q; qi; ,〉; ti)}
| r : q(s(x1; : : : ; xn))→A s(q1(x1); : : : ; qn(xn)) ∈ ,};
• if t ∈X then matchl(〈Q; q0; ,〉; t)= {[x → q0]}.
The interesting property of this function is that for all linear 3 term t ∈T (T;X),
for all automaton A= 〈Q; q0; ,〉, calling x1; : : : ; xn the variables in t, for all terms
t1; : : : ; tn ∈T (T), then t[ti=xi; : : : ; tn=xn]∈L(A) if and only if there exists p in matchl
(A; t) so that for all i; ti ∈Lp(xi)(A)). Informally, that means that this function returns
the set of matches of the term against the automaton, giving for each match and for
each variable the states in which this variable is to be recognized in that match.
We then construct a function match that has the same property, except that it does
not constrain the terms to be linear.
match(A; t) =

f ∈ matchl(A; t) | ∀x ∈ X
⋂
q∈f(x)
Lq(A) = ∅

 :
The de,nition of matchl translates into an algorithm on automata de,ned by trees
as above. Then match is de,ned, using an ePective test of whether the languages of
several automata intersect [13, Section 1.7].
The above property of matchl induces the following property on match:
Lemma 1. Given a term t with variables and a special automaton A, if there exists a
substitution  :FV (t)→T (F) of the free variables of the term t so that t[]∈L(A),
then there exists M ∈match(A; t) so that for each variable x; (x)∈L(M (x)).
4.4. The K] function on automata
We want an abstraction of the functionK; that is, a functionK] so thatK(L(A))⊆
L(K](A)) for all special automaton A. Actually, we shall give such a function so that
there is K(L(A))=L(K](A)).
We will use a notion of position in a term [27, p. 250] as a sequence of positive
integers describing the path from the root of the term to that position; ' will be the root
position. pos(t) is the set of positions in term t. By t|p we shall denote the subterm
of t rooted at position t. We de,ne the similar notions for trees.
Now we de,ne completion(A;R) (see Fig. 3 for an example) where A is a special
automaton and R is a simpli,cation system by induction on the structure of A: calling
q0 the initial state of A and calling C1; : : : ; Cn the children states of q0, that is, the
3 A term is said to be linear if all variables have at most one occurrence in it.
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Fig. 3. Completion of the automaton from Fig. 2 by the rewrite rule decrypt(encrypt(x; k); k)→ x. (a)
Before the completion. The dashed subtree is an expansion of paths going through the loops on q0, for the
sake of clarity. The dotted line is the '-transition we are adding. (b) After the completion. Not to use real
'-transitions, we add the children of q1 to the children of q0.
states two nodes away from q0:
construct A′, obtained by replacing in A the subtree starting from C1; : : : ; Cn by their
image by a → completion(a; R)
repeat
for a→ x∈R do
for f∈match(A′; a) do
if the following subtree is not already present, modulo state renaming
then
copy A′|f(x), replacing the state f(x) by q0 {adds a child to q0}
end if
end for
end for
until no new subtree is added to A′
return A′
Termination of this algorithm is ensured by the following property, proved by in-
duction on the structure of A: the set of subtrees of completion(A;R) is, modulo state
renaming, the set of subtrees of A. The repeat-until loop only inserts subtrees that were
already present in A modulo state renaming, and thus terminates, since there are only
a ,nite number of them and it never inserts twice the same.
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We then de,ne
K](A) = completion(AO;R)
where AO is A where the Jag on the initial state has been set to true.
Lemma 2. For any special automaton A, K(L(A))⊆L(K](A)).
Proof. L(K](A)) contains necessarily L(A), since all the transitions present in A
are present in K](A). Furthermore L(K](A)) is stable by K, since the completion
algorithm terminated. Since K(L(A)) is the least ,xpoint of K, the inclusion
follows.
5. Abstract model
The above concrete model has an annoying feature that makes it diCcult to analyze:
the in,nite nondeterminism of the intruder (the knowledge of the intruder is an in,nite
set). We suppress that diCculty by “folding” together all branches of the nondetermi-
nism of the intruder. This approximation is safe, in the sense that it always
overestimates what the intruder knows. What then remains is a system of bounded
nondeterminism, corresponding to the various possible interleavings of the principals.
As the number of principals is ,nite, that gives a ,nite state space (although the number
of interleavings grows fast with the number of principals).
Informally, our abstract works as follows: instead of using an in,nite set of terms
to model the knowledge of the intruder, we use a ,nite representation of an in,nite
set of terms; instead of individual terms stored in principals’ registers, we use ,nite
representations of set of terms that could possibly be held in those registers. A single
abstract state then stands for all the concrete states where the contents of the principals’
registers belong to the respective abstract sets and where the intruder’s knowledge is
a subset of the respective abstract state.
5.1. The abstract domain and the abstraction relation
An abstract global state S] ∈] is made of a tree automaton S]: I representing the
knowledge of the intruder, and the local states (S]:p)p∈P. Each local state S]:p is made
of a program sequence S]:p:P, with the same de,nition as in the concrete semantics,
and a family (S]:p:r)r∈rp of automata.
A single abstract state may represent (in,nitely) many corresponding concrete states.
The links between abstract states and concrete states is de,ned by an abstraction relation
(see Section 1.3).
Our abstraction relation a⊆×Sigma]: is de,ned as follows: for any S in  and
S] in ]
a(S; S])⇔ (S:I ⊆ L(S]:I)) ∧ ∀p ∈ P(S:p:P = ')
∨
{
S:p:P = S]:p:P
∀r ∈ Rp S:p:r ∈ L(S]:p:r):
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What this means intuitively is that we attach a regular set of terms, represented by a
special automaton, to each part of the concrete state that stores a term. An abstract
state is an abstraction of a concrete state if and only if all the terms of the concrete
state belong to the respective sets of terms.
5.2. Abstract semantics
We de,ne the semantics of the system by a nondeterministic transition relation →].
Let S] and S ′] be two global states. The de,nition of the transition relation is the
following: S]→] S ′] if there exists p0 ∈ P so that:
• for all p∈P so that p =p0, S ′]:p = S]:p;
• S]:p0:P= h :: ) and either
◦ h= ?r0 and
for all r ∈Rp0 so that r = r0, S ′]:p0: r= S]:p0: r,
S ′]:p0: r0 = S]: I
S ′]:p0:P= )
S ′]: I = S]: I
◦ h= !t and
for all r ∈Rp0 so that r = r0, S ′]:p0: r= S]:p0: r,
S ′]: I =K](S]: I unionsq t[S]:p0: r=r | r ∈Rp0 ])
S ′]:p0:P= )
◦ h= r =~ t, S ′]: I = S]: I and either
match(S]:p0: r; t[S]:p0: r=r | r ∈Rp0 ]) = ∅ then
for all $r ∈ $Rp0\FV (t), S ′]:p0: r= S]:p0: r
for all $r ∈FV (t), S ′]:p0: r=unionsq{M ($r) |M ∈match(S]:p0: r;
t[S]:p0: r=r | r ∈Rp0 ])} 4
S ′]:p0:P= )
match(S]:p0: r; t[S]:p0: r=r | r ∈Rp0 ])= ∅; then
for all r ∈Rp0 , S ′]:p0: r= S]:p0: r
S ′]:p0:P= '
5.3. Proof of correctness
The correctness of our method relies on the fact that →] is an abstraction of →
with respect to a, according to the de,nition in part 1.3. This means that our method
computes symbolically a superset of the set of reachable states.
Let us now prove this correctness condition. Let us consider a concrete transition
S→ S ′ (as de,ned in Section 3.2) and an abstract state S] so that S] is an abstraction
4 Replacing this condition by
∃M ∈ match(S]:p0:r; t[S]:p0:r=r | r ∈ Rp0 ]) ∀$r ∈ FV (t) S′]:p0:r = M:r
yields a less coarse abstract model, which still has the good property that nondeterminism is ,nite and traces
length are bounded. The model we use is clearly an abstraction of this more precise model.
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of S (as de,ned in Section 5.1). Let p0 be the principal that executes the transition
and S:p0:P= h :: ) the program it has to execute.
Since S] is an abstraction of S, for all p∈P, for all r ∈Rp, S:p:r ∈L(S]:p:r).
For p =p0, S ′:p:r= S:p:r and S ′]:p:r= S]:p:r, thus S ′:p:r ∈L(S ′]:p:r). Let us now
establish the remaining relations. There are several cases, depending on the instruction
being executed:
Input from network h= ?r0; then
• for all r ∈Rp0 , S ′:p0: r= S:p0: r; by the abstraction relation, S:p0: r ∈L(S]:p0: r) and
thus S ′:p0: r ∈L(S ′]:p0: r);
• S ′:p0: r0 ∈ S:I ; but S ′]:p0 = S]: I and S:I =L(S]: I), thus S:p0: r0 ∈L(S ′]:p0: r0);
• S ′:p0:P= )= S]:p0:P;
Output to network h= !t and
• for all r ∈Rp0 , S ′:p0: r= S:p0: r; by the abstraction relation, S:p0: r ∈L(S]:p0: r) and
thus S ′:p0: r ∈L(S ′]:p0: r);
• S ′: I =K(S:I ∪{t[S:p0: r=r | r ∈Rp0 ]}); since t[S:p0: r=r | r ∈Rp0 ]∈L(t[S]:p0: r=r | r ∈
Rp0 ]) (Lemma 1) and S:I ∈L(S]: I) then S:I ∪{t[S:p0: r=r | r ∈Rp0 ]}∈L(S]: I unionsq t[S]:
p0:r=r | r ∈Rp0 ]), and thus, using Lemma 2, S ′: I ∈L(S ′]: I).
• S ′:p0:P= )= S]:p0:P;
Pattern matching h= r0 =~ t and then either:
• there exists a substitution 1 : $Rp→T (F) so that r0 = t[1; 2] where 2 is the
substitution r→ S:p0: r;
◦ for all r ∈Rp0 so that $r is not a free variable in t; S ′:p0: r= S:p0: r; since in this
case S ′]:p0: r= S]:p0: r, it follows that S ′:p0: r ∈L(S ′]:p0: r);
◦ for all r ∈Rp0 so that $r is a free variable in t; S ′:p0: r= 1(r); but then there
exists M∈match(S]:p0: r; t[S]:p0: r=r | r ∈Rp0 ]) so that 1(r)∈L(M ($r)) (Lemma 1)
and thus a fortiori 1(r)∈L(unionsq{M ($r) |M ∈match(S]:p0: r; t[S]:p0: r=r | r∈Rp0 ])}),
which means that S ′:p0: r ∈L(S ′]:p0: r);
• such a substitution does not exist; then S ′:p0:P= ';
in any case,
• S ′:p0: r0 ∈ S:I ; but S ′]:p0 = S]: I and S:I =L(S]: I), thus S:p0: r0 ∈L(S ′]:p0: r0);
• S ′:p0:P= )= S]:p0:P;
5.4. Where the abstract and concrete models do not coincide
As we are dealing with an approximate model, it is important to know how much
information the model actually loses. There exists a simple example in which our
abstraction strictly overestimates the power of the intruder: a single principal A runs
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that very simple program
?r
!decrypt(r; K)
and the intruder initially knows {encrypt(X; K); encrypt(Y; K)}; X; Y and K being con-
stants initially unknown to the intruder. We want to know whether at the end of the
“protocol”, the intruder can get hold of the concatenation of X and Y .
Let us consider the concrete model. The intruder may send encrypt(X; K) or encrypt
(Y; K), in which case it obtains respectively decrypt(encrypt(X; K); K)= X or decrypt
(encrypt(Y; K); K)=Y after the second step, but it may not do so at the same time.
The intruder has to choose whether it wants to get X or Y . It is not possible for it to
get both X and Y , and it may therefore not compute the concatenation pair(X; Y ).
Let us now execute the abstract analysis by hand, step-by-step. After the ,rst step, we
know that register r may contain any of {encrypt(X; K); encrypt(Y; K)}. After the
,rst step, the abstract intruder knowledge gets augmented by {decrypt(encrypt(X; K))}.
Apply rewriting rules to this set yields that the abstract intruder knowledge contains
both X and Y . The abstract intruder can then compute the concatenation pair(X; Y ).
Is this overestimation of the power of the intruder relevant when dealing when real-
life protocols? Our investigations on examples of protocols found in classic papers on
the topic [10] did not show it was a problem; the above kind of example is largely
considered academic by the cryptographic protocol community. Furthermore, an error
that exists only in the approximation for n principals could well be a concrete error for
a greater number of principals. For instance, with the above example, if we run two
copies of A, the intruder really can get (X; Y ): it can obtain X from A1, then obtain Y
from A2, then compute (X; Y ). For these reasons, we think that the approximation is
,ne enough.
6. Implementation issues
Basing ourselves on the above theory, we implemented a protocol analyzer. This
program takes as input the signature and the rewrite system de,ning the term algebra
and a speci,cation of the protocol.
6.1. The protocol analyzer
Our program reads an input ,le containing:
• the signature of the algebra, divided between “public” and “private” constructors;
private constructors (like keys) cannot be applied by the intruder;
• the rewrite system;
• the initial knowledge of the intruder;
• what the intruder wants to get hold of (set L);
• the programs run by the principals.
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It then explores the interleavings of the principal actions, computing with the abstract
operations, and displays the interleavings that seem to exhibit a security hole (where
the abstract knowledge of the intruder contains an element of L).
6.2. Interleavings
It is not necessary to consider all possible interleavings. We only consider interleav-
ings that are concatenations of sequences of the following form: inputs and matches
by a principal, and outputs by the same principal. It is easy to see that any interleav-
ing is equivalent (when it comes to the ,nal knowledge of the intruder) to such an
interleaving. This reduction is similar to the partial order reduction techniques used
in model-checking [12, Chapter 10] to speed up analyzes of models of concurrent
asynchronous systems.
6.3. Implementation of the automata
We tried two implementations of the automata:
• One was closely based on the operations described above on special automata. Ele-
mentary operations, especially because of the use of hashed sets to test for identical
branches, are very fast. The problem is that special automata have no minimization
property and the size of automata grows fast as the length of the traces grows.
• The other one was operating on minimal deterministic ,nite tree automata [13]. Here,
it seems that the completion by the rewriting system (implemented as the insertion
of '-transitions and the ,nal determinization of the automaton) is very slow.
We also investigated whether some available toolkits such as MONA [29] and BANE
[18], but did not succeed in using any of those for our particular needs. The MONA
application programming interface is geared towards WS2S logic applications and han-
dling already computed automata is diCcult; on the other hand, BANE is more geared
towards computations on sets of terms, but it seemed that some useful features were
either missing or diCcult to implement without knowing the internals of the library.
We are also considering other possible implementations based on constraint solving [7].
The experimental results we obtained suggest the replacement of the rewriting system
by completion through a system of rules, which is computationally less expensive. This
needs some slight changes in the semantics, leading to a semantics similar to Goubault-
Larrecq’s [25].
7. Experimental results
We used the ,rst two implementations cited in Section 6.3 on some examples, some
of which academic samples, some of them real protocols from the standard papers on
the topic.
200 D. Monniaux / Science of Computer Programming 47 (2003) 177–202
7.1. Trials on small examples
We ,rst experimented our analyzer (computing on special automata) on some small
examples, among which:
• a single run of the Otway-Rees protocol [10];
• the “Test n” examples: n principals running each the program: ?r decrypt(r; Kn)
the initial knowledge of the intruder being encrypt(· · · (encrypt(X; K1); : : : ; Kn);
the unknown piece of data the intruder tries to recover being X .
Alas, while other protocols [10,22], when using similarly small number of principals,
have been easy to analyze using the program, bigger examples (like two parallel runs
of the Otway-Rees protocol) have made the computation times become too large.
7.2. An interesting point on the Otway-Rees protocol
An early trial of our program on the Otway-Rees protocol (Section 2.9) yielded
some unexpected results. This protocol features a principal A running:
! pair(A, pair(B, pair(M, encrypt(pair(pair(Na, M), pair(A, B)), Kas))));
? r;
r =˜ pair(B, pair(A, encrypt(pair(Na, $kab), Kas)));
! encrypt(X, kab);
The secret piece of data is X . After these four steps, the intruder can indeed get X
in the following way: at step 2, the intruder sends pair(B; pair(A; encrypt(pair(Na,
pair(A; B)); Kas))), built from pieces of the message output by A at step 1. A will
then use pair(A; B) as kab. On the other hand, reorganizing the output from step 1,
replacing pair(Na; pair(M; pair(A; B))) by pair(pair(Na;M); pair(A; B)), prevents
this attack, and the analyzer then concludes that the protocol is safe.
Whether or not the bug described above is relevant in real implementations depends
on how certain primitives, notably pairing, are implemented. Models taking associativity
and commutativity into account could perhaps be more suitable for analyses of such
properties.
8. Conclusions and prospects
We proposed a model based on tree automata to abstract cryptographic protocols.
We implemented our algorithms and were able to successfully and correctly analyze
some small instances (2 principals and 1 server) of well-known protocols and test
examples. Our abstraction is ,ne-grained enough to yield successful result on real-life
protocols.
The main drawback of our method is the high number of interleavings to consider,
which limits the number of simultaneous sessions to be analyzed in practice. It is
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nevertheless possible to use further abstraction to analyze larger numbers of sessions
provided we have a suitable widening operator [15]. Our idea of upper-approximate
sets of terms was further re,ned by Genet and Klay [20] through the use of stable
sets which enable the approximation of an unbounded number of sessions.
We hope that further progress on the algorithmics for abstract sets of trees [19,33]
will make the abstract analysis of cryptographic protocols, and thus automated proofs,
more tractable.
References
[1] M. Abadi, Secrecy by typing in security protocols, in: 14th Symp. on Theoretical Aspects of Computer
Science (STACS’97), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, Berlin, 1997.
[2] M. Abadi, Secrecy by typing in security protocols, J. ACM 46 (5) (1999) 749–786.
[3] M. Abadi, B. Blanchet, Secrecy types for asymmetric communication, in: Foundations of Software
Science and Computation Structures (FoSSaCS’01), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2030,
Springer, Berlin, April 2001.
[4] M. Abadi, A.D. Gordon, Reasoning about cryptographic protocols in the spi calculus, in: A.
Mazurkiewicz, J. Winkowski (Eds.), CONCUR ’97: Concurrency Theory, 8th Internat. Conf., Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1243, Warsaw, Poland, July 1997, Springer, Berlin, 1997, pp. 59–73.
[5] M. Abadi, A.D. Gordon, A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus, Research Report 149,
Compaq Systems Research Center, Palo Alto, CA, USA, January 1998.
[6] M. Abadi, M.R. Tuttle, A semantics for a logic of authentication, in: L. Logrippo (Ed.), 10th Annual
ACM Symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing, MontrUeal, QuUebec, Canada, August 1991, ACM
Press, New York, pp. 201–216.
[7] A. Aiken, E.L. Wimmers, Solving systems of set constraints (extended abstract), in: Proc. Seventh
Annu. IEEE Symp. on Logic in Computer Science, Santa Cruz, CA, 22–25 June 1992, IEEE Computer
Society Press, Silver Spring, MD, 1992, pp. 329–340.
[8] R. Amadio, D. Lugiez, On the reachability problem in cryptographic protocols, Technical Report 3915,
INRIA, 2000.
[9] M. Bellare, P. Rogaway, Provably secure session key distribution—the three party case, in: 27th ACM
Symp. on Theory of Computing (STOC), 1995, pp. 57–66.
[10] M. Burrows, M. Abadi, R. Needham, A logic of authentication, Technical Report 39, Digital Equipment
Corporation, Systems Research Centre, February 1989.
[11] I. Cervesato, N. Durgin, P. Lincoln, J. Mitchell, A. Scedrov, A meta-notation for protocol analysis, in:
CSFW 12: Proc. 12th Computer Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE Computer Society Press, Silver
Spring, MD, 1999.
[12] E.M. Clarke Jr., O. Grumberg, D.A. Peled, Model Checking, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999.
[13] H. Comon, M. Dauchet, R. Gilleron, D. Lugiez, S. Tison, M. Tommasi, Tree Automata Techniques and
Applications, Available through http://www.grappa.univ-lille3.fr/tata/.
[14] P. Cousot, MUethodes itUeratives de construction et d’approximation de points ,xes d’opUerateurs monotones
sur un treillis, analyse sUemantique de programmes, ThWese d’Uetat Wes sciences mathUematiques, UniversitUe
scienti,que et mUedicale de Grenoble, Grenoble, France, 21 mars 1978.
[15] P. Cousot, R. Cousot, Abstract interpretation and application to logic programs, J. Logic Progamming
2–3 (13) (1992) 103–179.
[16] D. Craigen, M. Saaltink, Using EVES to analyze authentication protocols, Technical Report
TR-96-5508-05, ORA Canada, Ottawa, March 1996.
[17] D. Dolev, C. Dwork, M. Naor, Non-malleable cryptography, in: ACM, editor, Proc. 23rd annual ACM
Symp. on Theory of Computing, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 6–8, 1991, IEEE Computer Society
Press, Silver Spring, MD, 1991, pp. 542–552 (Full version available from authors).
[18] M. FXahndrich, BANE: analysis programmer interface, Computer Science Department, University of
California at Berkeley, 1998.
202 D. Monniaux / Science of Computer Programming 47 (2003) 177–202
[19] T. Genet, Decidable approximations of sets of descendants and sets of normal forms, in: Rewriting
Techniques and Applications (RTA-98), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1379, Springer, Berlin,
1998.
[20] T. Genet, F. Klay, Rewriting for cryptographic protocol veri,cation, in: D. McAllester (Ed.), Automated
Deduction (CADE-17), Lecture Notes in Arti,cial Intelligence, vol. 1831, Springer, Berlin, 2000.
[21] Li Gong, Cryptographic protocols for distributed systems, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge,
Cambridge, England, April 1990.
[22] Li Gong, R. Needham, R. Yahalom, Reasoning about belief in cryptographic protocols, in: IEEE Symp.
on Research in Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, May 1990, IEEE Computer Society Press,
Silver Spring, MD, 1990, pp. 234–248.
[23] Li Gong, P. Syverson, Fail-stop protocols: an approach to designing secure protocols, in: 5th Internat.
Working Conf. on Dependable Computing for Critical Applications, September 1995.
[24] J. Goubault-Larrecq, Clap, a simple language for cryptographic protocols, available on the WWW, 1999.
[25] J. Goubault-Larrecq, A method for automatic cryptographic protocol veri,cation, in: D.M.B. Sanders
(Ed.), Beverly Sanders, Dominique M Fifth Internat. Workshop on Formal Methods for Parallel
Programming: Theory and Applications (FMPPTA 2000), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol.
1800, Springer, Berlin, 2000.
[26] S. Hanley, DNS overview with a discussion of DNS spoo,ng, http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/
DNS/DNS.htm.
[27] J.-P. Jouannaud, N. Dershowitz, Rewrite systems, in: J. van Leuween (Ed.), Handbook of Theoretical
Computer Science, vol. B, Elsevier, The MIT Press, Amsterdam, Cambridge, MA, 1990.
[28] D. Kindred, J.M. Wing, Fast, automatic checking of security protocols, in: Second USENIX Workshop
on Electronic Commerce, Oakland, California, November 1996, USENIX, pp. 41–52.
[29] N. Klarlund, A. MHller, MONA version 1.3: User Manual, BRICS, University of Aarhus, 1998.
[30] G. Lowe, Breaking and ,xing the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR, in: Proc. TACAS,
vol. 1055, Springer, Berlin, 1996, pp. 147–166.
[31] G. Lowe, Towards a completeness result for model checking of security protocols, in: 11th Computer
Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE, New York, 1998.
[32] W. Marrero, E.M. Clarke, S. Jha, Model checking for security protocols, Technical Report
CMU-SCS-97-139, Carnegie Mellon University, May 1997.
[33] L. Mauborgne, Representation of Sets of Trees for Abstract Interpretation, Ph.D. Thesis, UEcole
Polytechnique, 2000.
[34] C. Meadows, The NRL protocol analyzer: an overview, J. Logic Programming 26 (2) (1996). Also
available at http://chacs.nrl.navy.mil/publications/CHACS/1995/1995meadows-toappearJLP.ps.
[35] J.K. Millen, The interrogator: a tool for cryptographic protocol security, in: Proc. 1984 Symp. on
Security and Privacy (SSP ’84), Los Angeles, CA, USA, April 1990, IEEE Computer Society Press,
Silver Spring, MA, 1990, pp. 134–141.
[36] J.K. Millen, CAPSL: common authentication protocol speci,cation language, available on the WWW.
[37] D. Monniaux, Abstracting cryptographic protocols with tree automata, in: Sixth Internat. Static Analysis
Symp. (SAS’99), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1694, Springer, Berlin, 1999.
[38] D. Monniaux, Decision procedures for the analysis of cryptographic protocols by logics of belief, in:
12th Computer Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE, New York, 1999.
[39] B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, 2nd ed., Wiley, New York, 1996.
[40] J. Schumann, Automatic veri,cation of cryptographic protocols with SETHEO, in: W. McCune (Ed.),
Proc. 14th Internat. Conf. on Automated deduction, Lecture Notes in Arti,cial Intelligence, vol. 1249,
July 13–17 1997, Springer, Berlin, 1997, pp. 87–100.
[41] D. Song. Athena: a new eCcient automatic checker for security protocol analysis, in: 12th Computer
Security Foundations Workshop, IEEE, New York, 1999, pp. 192–202.
[42] P. Syverson, Adding time to a logic of authentication, in: 1st ACM Conf. on Computer and
Communications Security, 1993, pp. 97–101.
[43] P. Syverson, Towards a strand semantics for authentication logics, Electron. Notes Theoret. Comput.
Sci. 20 (1999).
[44] P. Syverson, P.C. van Oorschot, On unifying some cryptographic protocol logics, in: 1994 IEEE
Computer Society Symp. on Research in Security and Privacy, May 1994, pp. 14–28.
